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Abstract
We develop an axiomatic approach to decision under uncertainty that explicitly takes into
account the information available to the decision maker. The information is described by a
set of priors and a reference prior. We define a notion of imprecision for this informational
setting and show that a decision maker who is averse to information imprecision maximizes
the minimum expected utility computed with respect to a subset of the set of initially given
priors. The extent to which this set is reduced can be seen as a measure of imprecision
aversion. This approach thus allows a lot of flexibility in modelling the decision maker
attitude towards imprecision. In contrast, applying Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) maxmin
criterion to the initial set of priors amounts to assuming extreme pessimism.
Keywords: Uncertainty, Decision, Multiple Priors.
JEL Number: D81.
1 Introduction
Ellsberg (1961) experiments have established in a convincing and robust way that decision
makers generally prefer to act in settings in which they have better information. In the classic
two-urn experiments, subjects tend to choose to bet on the color of a ball drawn from an urn
whose composition is known, say, 50 black balls and 50 white balls rather than on the color of
a ball drawn from an urn that contains black and white balls in unknown proportion. These
experiments have led to a host of models of decision under uncertainty, such as the Choquet
expected utility model (Schmeidler (1989)) or the multiple prior model (Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989)), capturing the fact that agents might have aversion towards uncertainty. However,
these models, while referring to the Ellsberg’s experiments neglect an important aspect of these
experiments: the information the decision maker has when making his choice is not part of the
modelling.
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comments of a referee were very helpful to clarify the exposition of the paper. Financial support from the French
Ministry of Research (Action concerte´e incitative) is gratefully acknowledged.
†CNRS–CREST and ICER, gajdos@ensae.fr
‡EUREQua, CNRS-Universite´ Paris I Panthe´on-Sorbonne, Corresponding author: 106-112 bd de l’Hoˆpital,
75647 Paris Cedex 13, France, Tel: +33 (0)1 44 07 82 04, Fax: +33 (0)1 44 07 82 31, jmtallon@univ-paris1.fr
§EUREQua, CNRS-Universite´ Paris I Panthe´on-Sorbonne, vergnaud@univ-paris1.fr
1
In this paper, we adopt a new approach to modelling decision under uncertainty. We seek to
explain the kind of behavior observed in Ellsberg’s experiments by developing a setting in which
the decision maker’s preferences are defined on pairs (act, information). We thus assume that
the decision maker can rank acts in different informational settings, the latter being modelled
explicitly, and derive axiomatically a new decision criterion.
We now define more precisely what we call an informational state. First, we assume as
usual that the sources of uncertainty can be captured by a set of states of nature. Second, we
concentrate our attention on situations in which the information can be represented by a set of
probability distributions over the state space, together with an anchor or reference point. To
illustrate this idea, take Ellsberg’s three-color urn experiment (Ellsberg (1961)), in which the
decision maker is told that there are 30 red balls and 60 black or yellow balls in the urn, the
draw of a roulette wheel (with number from 0 to 60) giving the number of black balls. Then,
the set of priors that is appropriate to model the available information is simply the set of all
probability distributions that place 13 on Red. The anchor of this set is also rather naturally the
distribution (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3). Our main modelling assumption, that the decision maker has preferences
over pairs (act, information) asserts that the decision maker is able to compare say “betting
on Black when the information is as above” versus “betting on Black when the composition of
the urn is known to be (13 ,
1
6 ,
1
2)”. This notion of imprecise information represented by a set of
priors and an anchor is the same as the notion discussed in Hansen et alii (2001) and Wang
(2003). Hansen and Sargent (2002) provide another instance in which this modelling approach
is natural, reflecting “agents’ fear of model misspecification”:
“(...) the agent regards the model [for macroeconomists, a discrete time model is a
probability distribution over a sequence of vectors] as an approximation to another
unknown “true” model. The agent thinks his model is a good approximation in
the sense that the data are generated by another model that belongs to a vaguely
specified set of models near the approximating model.”
Hansen and Sargent (2002), Introduction to Elements of Robust Control and Filtering
for Macroeconomics.
With this setting in place, we suggest a partial order on the sets of priors with a common
anchor that reflects the degree of uncertainty, or imprecision in the information , the decision
maker faces. Intuitively, assuming that the information available to the decision maker can
be expressed by a set of priors, set inclusion seems to be a good candidate to rank situations
according to the information imprecision. However, as we will argue below, this order is too
strong. As in situations of risk in which the definition of risk aversion is based on the comparison
of two distributions that have a common mean, our definition of aversion towards imprecision
is based on the comparison of sets of probabilities (according to set inclusion) that have the
same anchor. Our axiom of aversion towards imprecision states that the decision maker prefers
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an act in a situation to the same act in a less precise situation (meaning a situation with the
same anchor but with a “larger” set of priors). In our representation theorem we establish that
a decision maker exhibiting aversion towards imprecision behaves as if evaluating an act by the
minimum over a revealed set of probability distributions of its expected utility. The revealed
set of probability distributions is a subset of the set of admissible probability distributions. An
extremely pessimistic agent will keep the entire set, i.e., the revealed set of priors will be equal to
the initial set of admissible priors. Conversely, a decision maker whose choices are not affected
by the imprecision of the situation reduces any prior set of probability distributions as much as
possible and ends up acting only on the basis of the anchor. Finally, we characterize axiomatically
a more specific decision criterion that is to take a convex combination of the minimal expected
utility with respect to probability distributions in the set of objectively admissible probability
distributions and of the expected utility with respect to the anchor. The coefficient of the
combination is a degree of pessimism.
A main contribution of the paper is therefore to provide a model in which the information
available to the decision maker is explicitly taken into account in his choice behavior. This is
of interest for applications of decision theory under uncertainty to problems in which data are
available although not precise enough to be encapsulated in the form of a single probability
distribution. Indeed, when it comes to applications, there seems to be a need to anchor prior
beliefs into observed data while the usual bayesian approach does not give any information as
to what prior beliefs should be formed.
Our approach allows a certain flexibility as to which revealed priors are compatible with the
information: this is important as it leaves room to model different attitudes towards imprecision,
and allows for decisions that are not necessarily biased towards extreme conservatism. Take for
instance the global warming problem. Scientific evidence has somewhat restricted the set of
possible values for important parameters, without being able, at this stage, to actually assess
what are the exact effects of emission of various gas on the average temperature. Taking this ev-
idence into account and applying the maxmin expected utility approach would then “uniquely”
determine the optimal (conservative) environmental policy, leaving no room for any influence of
the society attitude towards uncertainty. In our setting however, the attitude towards impre-
cision of the scientific evidence is an important element that, together with the evidence itself,
dictates the choice of the optimal environmental policy. Different societies, with different degree
of imprecision aversion, will choose different policies. More generally, we believe that modelling
scientific uncertainty requires the type of approach formulated here, as it seems difficult to deal
with such uncertainties in a probabilistic fashion: what does it mean for a scientific theory to
be valid with probability 13? In our approach on the other hand, one can associate a prior with
a theory (the reference prior being the dominant theory at the time) and simply consider all
theories (that have passed some minimal adequacy tests) as possible.
Another important consequence of the approach followed in the paper is that it enables one
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to perform comparative statics exercise, in which the imprecision of the information has changed.
This is indeed an important advantage over a purely subjectivist approach. Many results in the
literature on portfolio choice (under risk) for instance are based on some comparative statics on
the riskiness of the situation or on the degree of risk aversion. An application of the results of this
paper would be precisely to revisit some of this literature assuming imprecision. Interestingly,
the setting developed might provide some insights into, for example, the revision of the optimal
composition of a portfolio when market uncertainty increases or decreases.
Organization of the paper. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
our informational setup, and define a partial order on information, that reflects the accuracy or
conversely the imprecision of the information, independent of the decision maker’s preferences.
In Section 3, we present our main results. We first develop our formal setting, which requires
an operation of encoding states of nature of various situations into the set of integers. We next
present our decision criterion informally (Section 3.2). In Section 3.3 we provide an axiomatic
characterization of this criterion. We then discuss some properties of the revealed set of priors.
Next, we develop a more specific result, providing a simple functional form for the criterion. We
end the section with a study of comparative imprecision aversion. The last section contains a
discussion of the relationship with the literature as well as some concluding remarks. Proofs are
gathered in an appendix.
2 Sets of priors with an anchor
The decision problems we consider in this paper can be decomposed into two components: first
the possible actions the decision maker might take and, second, the available information about
the sources of uncertainty. In this section we concentrate on this second aspect and set up our
general framework for representing uncertainty. Uncertainty is represented through a family of
probability distributions together with a reference prior or anchor. It is a prior that belongs to
the (convex hull of the) given set of priors and has a particular salience in the decision problem
at hand.
2.1 Representation of information and some examples
Let S be a set of states of nature, Σ = 2S and let ∆(S) be the simplex on S. Let P be the
set of closed (in the weak convergence topology) subsets of ∆(S). An element P of P is the
set of all the probability distributions that are compatible with the available information in
a particular decision problem. We will refer to this set as the “objective” set of priors. We
consider finite settings in the sense that the number of relevant states of nature for a given
problem is finite. Hence, the sets P we will consider have the property that their support
S(P) = ∪p∈PSupp(p) are finite. Let C be the set of closed sets of priors with finite support. We
assume that the information available about the situation at hand also allows one to identify
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an anchor or center, i.e., a probability distribution over S that is (explicitly or by default) the
baseline scenario. A situation will be the given of a pair [P, c] of a set of priors in C, together
with an anchor c, such that c ∈ co(P), where co(A) is the convex hull of A for any set A. Let S
be the set of all such possible situations.
To start with well-known examples, consider Ellsberg’s two experiments, which are the usual
motivation for studying models of decision under uncertainty that cannot be reduced to decision
under risk.
Example 1 (Ellsberg’s two color urns) A decision maker faces two urns containing a hundred
balls (either black or white). He is told that there are 50 white balls and 50 black balls in the first
urn, while the proportion of each color in the second urn is unknown. In both cases there are two
states of nature: “the ball drawn is white” and “the ball drawn is black”. The information about
the known urn can be represented by the single probability measure (.5, .5). A natural description
of the second urn is to consider that all probability distributions over black and white balls are
possible, i.e., the set of priors is the entire simplex. Based on symmetry, the distribution (.5, .5)
is also a natural anchor for this problem.
Example 2 (Ellsberg’s three color urn) A decision maker has to bet over the color of a ball drawn
from an urn that contains 30 red balls and 60 black and yellow balls in unspecified proportions.
The decision maker hence knows that Pr(Red) = 13 , and nothing else, which constitutes the
set of priors compatible with the available information. As in the previous example, based on
symmetry reasons, the center of this set could be taken to be the distribution
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
.
In the two examples above, it seems natural to appeal to symmetry considerations to deter-
mine the anchor of the set of priors.1 However, this is not necessarily the case. The following
example captures the idea that agents might only have estimates of some important parameters
(e.g., the law of motion of the system in a macroeconomic setting, see Hansen and Sargent
(2002)).
Example 3 (Statistical inference) Consider the common practice of sampling a given population
to assess the probability p of appearance of a particular feature in this population. The common
practice in statistics is to consider as “possible” all the parameter values that fall into the 95%
confidence interval around the estimate of p. Thus, the set of priors is this interval and the
anchor the estimate of p.
Another example that can be treated in our setting is the case of two-stage lotteries. Segal
(1987) in particular argued that both Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes could be explained through
a relaxation of the reduction of compound lotteries axiom. When a second order probability
distribution is available, our set of priors can be taken to be the support of this second order
1We refer the reader to the concluding section for a discussion of this point.
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distribution and the anchor to be the mean of that distribution. This interpretation is strongly
related to Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2003)’s work, whose discussion is postponed to
Section 4. Finally, consider the case in which the decision maker asks their opinion to different
experts, who come up with different assessments of the situation.
Example 4 (Aggregation of expert’s opinions) A decision maker asks two experts to assess the
probability of occurrence of a given event. The first expert comes up with the evaluation (1, 0) (the
event will occur with probability 1) while the second expert comes up with the evaluation (0, 1)
(the event will occur with probability 0). The decision maker, acknowledging the disagreement
among the experts will keep these two distributions as possible. The center of this set might
depend on the reliability of the experts. If both are equally reliable, the center is simply the
distribution (12 ,
1
2).
This example can be extended to models representing situations in which scientific theories
compete for explaining a particular phenomenon. Scientific theories are then viewed as proba-
bility distributions over a state space. The set of priors therefore amounts to the set of theories
and the anchor is then the dominant theory, challenged by the new ones.
2.2 Comparison of imprecise information
The representation of uncertainty through sets of priors has a direct implication for the compar-
ison of two situations. A situation will rather naturally be considered more imprecise than an
other if the set of probability distributions considered possible in the second situation is included
in the set of probabilities in the first situation. However, mere set inclusion is not enough in our
view. Indeed, our motivation here is to characterize a notion of imprecision with the idea that
a decision maker will always prefer a given decision in the least imprecise situation. Hence, our
definition of what it means for a situation to be more precise than an other has to be guided by
what one would intuitively consider as the sensible choice behavior of a decision maker in more
or less imprecise situations. In other words, we need to define the notion of “more imprecise
than” keeping in mind the type of choice behavior we want to analyze. Thus, although it seems
sensible to say that the situation in which the decision maker knows that there are 1 white
and 99 black balls in an urn is more precise than the situation in which he has no information
whatsoever on the proportion of white and black balls, it seems also sensible to assume that the
decision maker would prefer to bet on white in the unknown urn rather than in the known urn.
This gives rise to the definition of a center preserving increase in imprecision:
Definition 1 Let [P1, c1], [P2, c2] ∈ S. The situation [P1, c1] is a (weak) center preserving in-
crease in imprecision of the situation [P2, c2] if
1. P1 is more imprecise than P2, i.e., co (P1) ⊇ co (P2).
2. c1 = c2.
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This definition captures the intuition that an urn with 100 balls, in which it is known that
there are at least 20 white and 20 black balls is more precise than an urn whose composition
is unknown (under the assumption that the center is the same in the two situations.) Another
intuitive feature that is embedded in our definition is slightly more subtle. Consider Ellsberg’s
two color urns experiment again and assume there are two balls in each urn. The situation can
be described by the set P1 = {(1, 0), (0, 1)} of probability distributions over {White,Black}
and center (12 ,
1
2). Now consider the same story, but with three balls in each urn. The set of
compatible priors is P2 = {(1, 0), (23 , 13), (13 , 23), (0, 1)} and its center is (12 , 12). Intuitively, the
imprecision of the two situations is the same, as intuition suggests that the number of balls is
immaterial here, and indeed our definition asserts precisely that these two situations are identical
as far as imprecision is concerned, since the convex hull of the two sets coincide and their centers
are identical.
Finally, we illustrate our definition with respect to sampling. Take two situations, in which an
econometrician has estimated a parameter and has found the same value. In the first situation,
he has estimated the parameter on a sample of say a hundred observations, while in the second
he has estimated it on a sample of two hundred observations. Then, taking the point estimate
as the center and the 95% confidence interval as the set of priors, it is obvious to check that the
first situation is a center preserving increase in imprecision of the second situation.
3 Representation theorems
In this section, we first introduce our decision setting. Next, we describe the decision criterion
informally and discuss some of its properties. We then turn to the axiomatic characterization of
the criterion. We next discuss properties of revealed beliefs. Strengthening our axiom of aversion
to imprecision leads to another representation theorem. We close the section by presenting
results on comparative aversion towards imprecision.
3.1 Setup
Our aim is to allow choices between acts involving different state spaces. For instance, we want
to model the choice between “bet 50 euros that a ball drawn randomly from an urn containing
30 red balls and 60 black or yellow balls in unknown proportion is red” which we represent as act
g with information [Pg, cg] that is defined on the state space Sg = {Red,Black, Y ellow}, and
“bet 100 euros that a ball drawn randomly from an urn containing 100 white and black balls
in unknown proportion is black” which we represent as act f with information [Pf , cf ] that is
defined on the state space Sf = {Black,White}. The formal difficulty is that the probabilistic
information is not defined on the same state space. A way to proceed is to use N as an “encoding
space”, that is used to embed all the information in the same space. On our example, this simply
means that we encode the different colors in different urns through integers, i.e., {Red in urn
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I} is state 1, {Black in urn I} is state 2, {Yellow in urn I} is state 3, {Black in urn II} is state
4, and {White in urn II} is state 5. We will make sure in our axiomatic construction that the
specific encoding used is immaterial, in the sense that choice behavior does not depend on it.
As Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) among others we use the framework of Anscombe and
Aumann (1963). This is mostly for the sake of simplicity, as it enables us to build on their
representation theorem. Let X be a set (the set of outcomes) and let Y be the set of distributions
over X with finite support (roulette lotteries). An act f is a mapping from S to Y . We denote
by A the set of acts (horse lotteries). Let ky be the constant act that gives the lottery y ∈ Y
in all states, and Ac the set of constant acts. We denote δx the lottery giving x ∈ X with
probability one. Finally, for E ⊂ S, let fEg be the act giving f(s) is s ∈ E and g(s) otherwise.
The decision maker’s preferences is a binary relation  over A × S, that is on couples
(f, [P, c]). As usual,  and ∼ denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts, respectively, of  .
Getting back to the example we started this section with, the bets are given by (g, [Pg, cg])
and (f, [Pf , cf ]), where the values of f and g are defined as follows (X is equal to the set of real
numbers):
s 1 2 3 4 5 s > 5
g δ50 δ0 δ0 δ0 δ0 y
f δ0 δ0 δ0 δ100 δ0 z
with y, z ∈ Y , and:
[Pg, cg] =
[{
(13 , p,
2
3 − p, 0, 0, 0, ...)|p ∈ [0, 23 ]
}
,
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , 0, 0, 0, ...
)]
[Pf , cf ] =
[{(0, 0, 0, p, 1− p, 0, ...)|p ∈ [0, 1]} , (0, 0, 0, 12 , 12 , 0, ...)]
Observe that f and g have been arbitrarily defined for s > 5, since we need to define acts
on the entire state space S. However, our axioms will ensure that their definition outside the
support of the information set is irrelevant (this is a consequence of Axiom 2, below). Then,
(g, [Pg, cg])  (f, [Pf , cf ]) means that act g in the situation [Pg, cg] is preferred to act f in
situation [Pf , cf ].
3.2 Decision criterion
The decision criterion that we will characterize axiomatically in the next section states that
(f, [Pi, ci])  (g, [Pj , cj ]) if, and only if:
min
p∈F[Pi,ci]
∫
u ◦ fdp ≥ min
p∈F[Pj ,cj]
∫
u ◦ gdp.
In this expression, u is the utility function and F[Pi,ci] is a subfamily of Pi that can be
interpreted as the subjective family of priors revealed by the decision maker through choice
behavior. The decision criterion implies that the decision maker acts as if he were using the
maxmin expected utility model but with respect to a family of priors that is a subset of the
given set of priors, representing available information.
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At one extreme, the decision maker’s revealed set of priors reduces to a singleton. In this
case, the structure imposed on the model requires that this prior is the anchor of the objective
set of priors. The criterion then reduces to the expected utility criterion: the decision maker
evaluates an act in a given situation by taking the expected utility of that act with respect to the
anchor. This behavior corresponds to neutrality towards imprecision of the prior information.
In particular, such a decision maker would be indifferent between an act f in a situation [P, c]
and the same act in the situation [P ′, c′] which is a center preserving increase in imprecision of
[P, c]. At the other extreme, the decision maker’s revealed set of priors is the same as the one
he was given to begin with, i.e., F[P,c] is equal to P. The criterion is then the maxmin expected
utility criterion on the entire family of priors representing the situation, axiomatized in a context
similar to ours in Wang (2003). Such a decision maker could be said to have an extreme aversion
towards imprecision. Our model is hence flexible enough to accommodate bayesian (expected
utility) behavior on the one hand and extreme pessimism on the other hand. In between these
two extremes lie all the possible attitudes towards imprecision: the extent to which the decision
maker “shrinks” the given family can be seen as a measure of his aversion towards imprecision.
The criterion we obtain looks similar to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) multiple prior model.
However, the setting and the axiomatic characterization are rather different (in particular, their
axiom of uncertainty aversion is based on mixture of acts.) We postpone the discussion of the
relationship between the two approaches after the presentation of the axiomatic characterization
of our criterion.
3.3 Axiomatic characterization
In this section, we develop the axiomatic characterization of the criterion introduced above. Our
axioms bear on couples (act, situation) which is unusual in the literature (although see Wang
(2003)), but are otherwise interpretable in much the same way as in the more traditional von
Neumann-Morgenstern setting. We begin by assuming that the preference relation is a weak
order.
Axiom 1 (Weak order)  is complete and transitive.
The second axiom states that the way the encoding of the states of nature into N is done
does not matter and requires some further definitions. The aim of this construction is to ensure
that the only relevant information upon which the decision maker is acting is the set of induced
probability distributions over outcomes and not the states of the world themselves.
For any ϕ onto mapping from S to S (i.e ϕ(S) = S), for any f ∈ A, we say that f is
ϕ-measurable if f(s) = f(s′) for all s, s′ ∈ S such that ϕ(s) = ϕ(s′). We will use the following
notation.
Notation 1
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• For all f ∈ A, and all ϕ onto mapping from S to S such that f is ϕ-measurable, fϕ is
defined by fϕ(s) = f(s′) where s′ ∈ ϕ−1(s) for all s ∈ S.
• For any p ∈ ∆(S) and [P, c] ∈ S and ϕ onto mapping from S to S, pϕ is defined by
pϕ(s) = p(ϕ−1(s)) for all s ∈ S and Pϕ by Pϕ = {q ∈ ∆(S)|q = pϕ, p ∈ P}. Furthermore,
we will note [P, c]ϕ = [Pϕ, cϕ], and (f, [P, c])ϕ = (fϕ, [P, c]ϕ).
If ϕ is a bijection, note that for all p ∈ ∆(S), there is a unique q ∈ ∆(S) such that qϕ = p.
Axiom 2 (Equivalence indifference) For all f, g ∈ A, [P, c] ∈ S,
• (f, [P, c]) ∼ (fS(P)g, [P, c])
• if ϕ is an onto mapping from S to S such that f is ϕ-measurable, then (f, [P, c]) ∼
(f, [P, c])ϕ.
Axiom 2 implies in particular that for all constant act f ∈ Ac, for all [P1, c1], [P2, c2] ∈ S,
(f, [P1, c1]) ∼ (f, [P2, c2]).
Example 5 Consider Ellsberg’s two urns example and encode {Black in urn I} by 1, {White
in urn I} by 2, {Black in urn II} by 3, {White in urn II} by 4. The preference of the decision
maker to bet on, say, Black in the known urn rather than on Black in the urn with an unknown
proportion of black and white balls would be written: (f, [P1, c1])  (g, [P2, c2]) where f is the
act defined by f(1) = δ1 and f(s) = δ0 for all s 6= 1, g is the act defined by g(3) = δ1 and
g(s) = δ0 for all s 6= 3, P1 = {(12 , 12 , 0, 0, 0, ...)} = {c1}, P2 = {(0, 0, p, 1− p, 0, ...)|p ∈ [0, 1]} and
c2 = (0, 0, 12 ,
1
2 , 0, ...).
An equivalent description for the comparison at hand would be to encode {White in urn I or
II} by 1, {Black in urn I} by 2, and {Black in urn II} by 3. Let f ′ be defined by f ′(2) = δ1 and
f ′(s) = δ0 for all s 6= 1, and let g′ be defined by g′(3) = δ1 and g′(s) = δ0 for all s 6= 3. Let P ′1 =
{(12 , 12 , 0, 0, ...)}, P ′2 = {(p, 0, 1 − p, 0, ...)|p ∈ [0, 1]}, c′1 = (12 , 12 , 0, 0, ...) and c′2 = (12 , 0, 12 , 0, ...).
Define ϕ by ϕ(1) = 2, ϕ(2) = ϕ(4) = 1, ϕ(3) = 3, and ϕ(s) = s−1 for all s ≥ 4. Then, observing
that f ′ = fϕ, g′ = gϕ and [P ′i, c′i] = [P, c]ϕi, Axiom 2 imposes that
(f, [P1, c1])  (g, [P2, c2])⇔ (f ′, [P ′1, c′1])  (g′, [P ′2, c′2])
The next axiom is an independence axiom that requires to define the notion of probabilistic
mixture of situations. We first introduce some notation.
Notation 2 Let P,P∗ ∈ P. For all p ∈ P and p∗ ∈ P∗, we denote by αp + (1 − α)p∗ the
probability distribution with support S(P) ∪ S(P∗), defined by:
(αp+ (1− α)p∗)(s) = αp(s) + (1− α)p∗(s) if s ∈ S(P) ∩ S(P∗)
(αp+ (1− α)p∗)(s) = αp(s) if s ∈ S(P) \ S(P∗)
(αp+ (1− α)p∗)(s) = (1− α)p∗(s) if s ∈ S(P∗) \ S(P)
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Furthermore, we denote by αP + (1− α)P∗ the set:
{q ∈ ∆(S(P ∪ P∗)) |q = αp+ (1− α)p∗, p ∈ P, p∗ ∈ P∗ }
Definition 2 (Probability mixture) Let [P, c] , [P∗, c∗] ∈ S, and α ∈ [0, 1]. The α : (1 − α)-
mixture of [P, c] and [P∗, c∗], denoted α [P, c] + (1− α) [P∗, c∗], is defined by :
α [P, c] + (1− α) [P∗, c∗] = [αP + (1− α)P∗, αc+ (1− α)c∗]
Example 6 Consider Ellsberg’s two-urn experiment again, using the first encoding described in
Example 5. The α : (1− α)-mixture of [P1, c1] and [P2, c2] is the situation given by
αP1 + (1− α)P2 =
{(
1
2
α,
1
2
α, (1− α)p, (1− α)(1− p), 0, ...
)
|p ∈ [0, 1]
}
and
αc1 + (1− α)c2 =
(
1
2
α,
1
2
α,
1
2
(1− α), 1
2
(1− α), 0, ...
)
Notation 3 A particular instance of a mixture, that will be heavily used in the sequel, is the
α : (1− α)-mixture of [P, c] with [P, c]ϕ. We will denote it [P, c](α,ϕ)M .
We are now in a position to state our mixture independence axiom.
Axiom 3 (Mixture independence) For all [Pi, ci] ∈ S, i = 1, 2, 3, such that (S(P1) ∪ S(P2)) ∩
S(P3) = ∅, for all α ∈ [0, 1), and for all f, g ∈ A such that f(s) = g(s) for all s ∈ S(P3),
(f, [P1, c1])  (g, [P2, c2])⇔ (f, α[P1, c1] + (1− α)[P3, c3])  (g, α[P2, c2] + (1− α)[P3, c3])
When sets of priors are reduced to singletons this is the usual independence axiom. We next
need another operation on sets of priors, that we dub replication.
Definition 3 (Replication) Let [P, c] ∈ S, α ∈ [0, 1], and S′ ⊂ N such that S′ ∩ S(P) = ∅. Let
ϕ be a bijection from S to S such that ϕ(S(P)) = S′. The (α, ϕ)-replication of [P, c] denoted
[P, c](α,ϕ)R is defined by:
[P, c](α,ϕ)R =
[{q ∈ ∆(S(P) ∪ S′)|q = αp+ (1− α)pϕ, p ∈ P}, αc+ (1− α)cϕ]
Note that [P, c](1,ϕ)R = [P, c] and [P, c](0,ϕ)R = [P, c]ϕ.
Example 7 Consider an urn with one ball, that could be black or white. Consider the “replica-
tion” of this urn, with one ball that could be red or green. Replication could be thought of as, for
instance, taking the initial urn, duplicate it, and painting the ball red if it was originally black
or green if it was originally white. Let us encode the different colors in the different urns as
follows: {Black in urn I} is state 1, {White in urn I} is state 2, {Red in urn II} is state 3, and
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{Green in urn II} is state 4. Define ϕ(1) = 3, ϕ(2) = 4, ϕ(3) = 1, ϕ(4) = 2 and ϕ(s) = s for
all s > 4. Then the 12 -replication is the the set {(12 , 0, 12 , 0, 0, ...), (0, 12 , 0, 12 , 0, ...}. It corresponds
to the description of the urn that is composed by putting together the two urns described. Since
by definition they have the “same” composition, the only possible states are those in which either
the balls are Black and Red, or the balls are White and Green, and in each case there is exactly
one ball of each color.
More generally, the α-replication of P would correspond (when α is rational) to the descrip-
tion of the urn composed by putting together n identical urns {B,W} and n′ (identical) urns
{R,G} generated as described above, with α = nn+n′ .
Define the mixture of two acts αf + (1 − α)g as usual, i.e., it is the act giving f(s) with
probability α and g(s) with probability (1− α) in state s.
Axiom 4 (Replication indifference) For all [P, c] ∈ S, for all replication [P, c](α,ϕ)R , for all
f, g ∈ A such that f(s) = g(s) for all s ∈ S\ S(P),
(αf + (1− α)g, [P, c]) ∼ (fS(P)gϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)R )
In the previous axiom, observe that fS(P)gϕ(s) = f(s) = g(s) for all s ∈ S\(S(P) ∪ ϕ(S(P)).
The next axiom is a continuity axiom.
Axiom 5 (Continuity) For all f , g, h ∈ A, and all [P, c] ∈ S, if (f, [P, c])  (g, [P, c]) 
(h, [P, c]), then there exist α and β in ]0, 1[ such that :
(αf + (1− α)h, [P, c])  (g, [P, c])  (βf + (1− β)h, [P, c]).
Note that  induces a preference relation `[P,c] on Y which is simply the restriction of 
on Ac×{[P, c]}. The next axiom states that the order  should be monotonic when comparing
couples (f, [P, c]) and (g, [P, c]) in which the act-component are ranked according to the `[P,c]
order.
Axiom 6 (Monotonicity) For all f, g ∈ A, and all [P, c] ∈ S, if f(s) `[P,c] g(s) for all s ∈ S(P),
then (f, [P, c])  (g, [P, c]).
The next axiom is rather weak and simply requires that for any situation, there exists a pair
of acts that are not indifferent.
Axiom 7 (Non-degeneracy) For all [P, c] ∈ S, there exist f ,g ∈ A such that (f, [P, c]) 
(g, [P, c]).
The axiom of aversion towards imprecision is at the heart of our construction. It relates
behavior in two different situations, one being a center preserving increase in imprecision of the
other, and states that the decision maker will always prefer to act in the second situation.
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Axiom 8 (Aversion towards imprecision) For all f ∈ A, [P1, c1], [P2, c2] ∈ S such that [P1, c1]
is a center preserving increase in imprecision of [P2, c2], (f, [P2, c2])  (f, [P1, c1]).
Aversion towards imprecision only compares situations with the same anchor (i.e., c1 = c2).
It thus has no bite for situations which are ranked according to the set inclusion order, if they
do not have the same anchor. This feature is important in understanding why the axiom allows
for a whole range of attitudes towards imprecision. Our last axiom is a Pareto principle that
states that if f is preferred to g for all singleton sets of priors included in P, then f is preferred
to g when information is the union of all these singletons.
Axiom 9 (Pareto) For all [P, c] ∈ S, if for all p ∈ P, we have (f, [{p}, p])  (g, [{p}, p]), then
(f, [P, c])  (g, [P, c]).
The next theorem is our main result. It provides a characterization of our set of axioms, in
which the notion of uncertainty aversion is captured by aversion towards information imprecision.
Theorem 1 Axioms 1 to 9 hold if, and only if, there exists an unique (up to a positive linear
transformation) affine function u : Y → R, and for all [Pi, ci] ∈ S, there exist unique, non-empty,
closed and convex sets F[Pi,ci] of probability measures on 2S, satisfying
1. F[Pi,ci] ⊆ Pi
2. For all ϕ onto mapping from S to S, F[Pi,ci]ϕ =
(F[Pi,ci])ϕ
3. If [Pi, ci] , [Pj , cj ] ∈ S are such that S(Pi) ∩ S(Pj) = ∅, then for all α ∈ [0, 1],
Fα[Pi,ci]+(1−α)[Pj ,cj ] = αF[Pi,ci] + (1− α)F[Pj ,cj ]
4. If [Pi, ci] is a center preserving increase in imprecision of [Pj , cj ] then F[Pi,ci] ⊇ F[Pj ,cj ]
5. For [P, c] ∈ S, for all replication [P, c](α,ϕ)R ,
F
[P,c](α,ϕ)R
=
{
αp+ (1− α)pϕ|p ∈ F[P,c]
}
such that for all f, g ∈ A, (f, [Pi, ci])  (g, [Pj , cj ]) if, and only if:
min
p∈F[Pi,ci]
∫
u ◦ fdp ≥ min
p∈F[Pj ,cj]
∫
u ◦ gdp.
The theorem provides an axiomatization of the maxmin multiple prior model where the
revealed set of priors is constrained by the available information. These constraints are reflected
in conditions 1 to 5 that put structure on the revealed set and will be discussed in the next section.
The theorem is proved in the appendix and we simply sketch the strategy of the proof here. The
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latter consists in using Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) result. More specifically, restricting choice
among acts in a given situation and imposing Gilboa and Schmeidler’s certainty independence
and uncertainty aversion, we can use their result to establish that the decision criterion is of the
maxmin expected utility type – Axiom 2 implying that the utility function is independent of the
situation (Theorem 4 in the Appendix). We then show that our set of axioms implies Gilboa
and Schmeidler’s and derive the conditions on the revealed set of priors from the additional
structure of our model, namely the way the decision maker processes information.
3.4 Properties of the revealed set of priors
Theorem 1 provides an axiomatization of the maxmin multiple prior model where the revealed
set of priors is constrained by the available information. Condition 1 expresses the “natural”
restriction that the revealed family be included in the objective data, which therefore provide
bounds on the beliefs. As mentioned above, any revealed family from a single prior (the center)
to the entire objective family is admissible.
Condition 2 is a consistency requirement that relates the revealed family in a situation [Pi, ci]
to the revealed family in a situation that is linked to the previous one. When ϕ is a bijection,
this means for instance that the revealed family is invariant to a permutation of the states if the
available information is the same. To illustrate this, consider Ellsberg’s three color urn example,
with the following encoding of the states: {1} is associated to Red, {2} to Black and {3} to
Yellow. The information the decision maker has is hence P = {p ∈ ∆(S)|p(1) = 13 , p(2)+p(3) =
2
3}. Assume the center is (12 , 13 , 13 , 0, ...). Let ϕ : S → S be defined by ϕ(1) = 1, ϕ(2) = 3,
ϕ(3) = 2, and ϕ(s) = s for all s 6= 1, 2, 3. We then have [P, c]ϕ = [P, c].
Condition 2 in Theorem 1 implies F[P,c]ϕ =
(F[P,c])ϕ and hence we have in this particular
case that F[P,c] =
(F[P,c])ϕ. In our example, this simply means that for every q ∈ F[P,c]ϕ , there
exists p ∈ F[P,c] such that q(1) = p(1), q(2) = p(3) and q(3) = p(2), and conversely. Hence,
the revealed set of beliefs has to be “symmetric” around its center. For instance, one can have
F[P,c] = {(13 , 13 − pi, 13 + pi, 0, ...)|pi ∈ [−16 , 16 ]}, but it is not possible to have F[P,c] = {(13 , 13 −
pi, 13 + pi, 0, ...)|pi ∈ [−14 , 16 ]} since if it were the case, one would have (13 , 712 , 112 , 0, ...) ∈ F[P,c] but
(13 ,
7
12 ,
1
12 , 0, ...) /∈
(F[P,c])ϕ.
Condition 3 relates the revealed family of the mixture of two situations to the two revealed
families associated to these two situations and states that the mixture operation does not reduce
imprecision.
Condition 4 states that, given two situations that can be compared according to the partial
order defined in Section 2.2, it must be the case that the revealed set of priors in the less
imprecise situation is included in the revealed set of priors in the more imprecise situation.
To illustrate Condition 5, we pursue on Ellsberg’s three color urn developed in the discussion
of Condition 2. Assume as there that the revealed set of beliefs is F[P,c] = {(13 , 13 − pi, 13 +
pi, 0, ...)|pi ∈ [−16 , 16 ]}. Consider the 12 -replication of [P, c], in which states 1, 2, 3 are sent to
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states 3, 4, 5 and vice versa. Then, Condition 5 asserts that the revealed set of priors has to be
F
[P,c](
1
2 ,ϕ)
R
=
{(
1
6
,
1
6
− pi
2
,
1
6
+
pi
2
,
1
6
,
1
6
− pi
2
,
1
6
+
pi
2
, 0, ...
) ∣∣∣ pi ∈ [−1
6
,
1
6
]}
This is to be compared with the revealed family when that same situation [P, c] is mixed (with
weight 12) with [P, c]ϕ, as given by Conditions 2 and 3:
F
[P,c](
1
2 ,ϕ)
M
=
{(
1
6
,
1
6
− pi
2
,
1
6
+
pi
2
,
1
6
,
1
6
− pi
′
2
,
1
6
+
pi′
2
, 0, ...
) ∣∣∣ pi ∈ [−1
6
,
1
6
]
, pi′ ∈
[
1
6
,
1
6
]}
The fact that F
[P,c](
1
2 ,ϕ)
M
⊂ F
[P,c](
1
2 ,ϕ)
R
is a direct consequence of Lemma 1 in the Appendix,
which states that the mixture operation yields situations that are center preserving increases in
imprecision compared to the replication operation.
3.5 Characterizing aversion towards imprecision
In this section, we strengthen the axiom of aversion to imprecision of information and obtain a
more specific representation theorem.
Axiom 10 (Dominance) For all f, g ∈ A, [P1, c1] , [P2, c2] ∈ S, if (f, [{c1}, c1])  (g, [{c2}, c2])
and for all p ∈ P1, there exists q ∈ P2 such that (f, [{p}, p])  (g, [{q}, q]), then (f, [P1, c1]) 
(g, [P2, c2]).
It is easy to show that this axiom is indeed a strengthening of the aversion to imprecise
information axiom and actually that it implies Axioms 8 and 9.
Theorem 2 Axioms 1 to 7, and 10 hold if, and only if, there exist an unique (up to a pos-
itive linear transformation) affine function u : Y → R, and α ∈ [0, 1], such that for all
[P1, c1] , [P2, c2] ∈ S, for all f, g ∈ A,
(f, [P1, c1])  (g, [P2, c2])
if, and only if,
α min
p∈co(P1)
∫
u ◦ fdp+ (1− α)
∫
u ◦ fdc1 ≥ α min
p∈co(P2)
∫
u ◦ gdp+ (1− α)
∫
u ◦ gdc2
The parameter α in the above representation theorem can be interpreted as a degree of
pessimism of the decision maker. If α = 0, he behaves as an expected utility maximizer with
respect to the anchor probability, while if α = 1, he behaves as a maximizer of the minimum
expected utility with respect to all the distributions compatible with his information.
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3.6 Comparative imprecision aversion
In this section, we show that a decision maker is more averse towards imprecision than another
if, in any given situation, his revealed set of priors is included in the second decision maker’s
revealed set. Assume from now on that the set of consequences X is equal to [0,M ] ⊂ R and
that preferences respect the natural order on [0,M ], i.e., if x, y ∈ [0,M ] and x > y, then, in any
possible situation, the decision maker prefers getting the constant degenerate lottery kδx giving
him x in all the states to getting kδy .
Let YB be the set of lotteries over {0,M}, i.e., the set of lotteries whose outcomes consist
only of the two extreme prizes. y ∈ YB can be written (0, p;M, 1− p). Similarly, let AB be the
set of acts defined on YB, i.e., acts that can be written f(s) = ys with ys = (0, 1−ps;M,ps) ∈ YB
for all s ∈ S.
Definition 4 Let a and b be two preference relations defined on A × S. We say that b is
more imprecision averse than a if for all y ∈ YB and all f ∈ AB, and for all [P, c] ∈ S,
(ky, [P, c]) a (f, [P, c])⇒ (ky, [P, c]) b (f, [P, c])
and
(ky, [P, c]) a (f, [P, c])⇒ (ky, [P, c]) b (f, [P, c])
where ky is the constant act giving the binary lottery y in all states.
This definition differs from the one in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) and Epstein (1999),
in that we restrict attention to comparisons among binary lotteries and binary acts.
Definition 5 Let (f, [P, c]) ∈ A × S. Call the probabilistic binary equivalent of (f, [P, c]) the
lottery Pe(f, [P, c]) = (0, 1 − p;M,p) ∈ YB such that (f, [P, c]) ∼ (kPe(f,[P,c]), [P, c]), where
kPe(f,[P,c]) is the constant act giving Pe(f, [P, c]).
Under continuity, such a probabilistic binary equivalent always exists. Probabilistic binary
equivalent can be associated to the probability p of gettingM in the lottery Pe(f, [P, c]). Denote
Π(f, [P, c]) this quantity, i.e., Pe(f, [P, c]) = (0, 1 − Π(f, [P, c]);M,Π(f, [P, c])). Normalize
utilities so that u(δ0) = 0 and u(δM ) = 1. It is straightforward to see that for  satisfying all
the axioms of Theorem 1, if [P1, c1] is a center preserving imprecision increase of [P2, c2], then,
for all f ∈ A, Π(f, [P2, c2]) ≤ Π(f, [P1, c1]).
Theorem 3 Let a and b be two preference relations defined on A× S, satisfying all axioms
of Theorem 1. Then, the following assertions are equivalent
(i) b is more averse towards imprecision than a
(ii) for all (f, [P, c]) ∈ AB × S, Πa(f, [P, c]) ≥ Πb(f, [P, c])
(iii) for all [P, c] ∈ S, Fa[P,c] ⊆ Fb[P,c]
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This theorem provides an easy way of comparing two decision makers in terms of their
attitudes towards imprecision: the decision maker operating the largest contraction on the set
of compatible priors is the one who is the less averse towards imprecision.
4 Discussion
We discuss first the relationship with the literature and then offer some concluding comments.
4.1 Relationship with the literature
The decision criterion we axiomatized belongs to the family of “maxmin expected utility” crite-
rion a` la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), for which an act f is preferred to an act g if and only if
minp∈Q
∫
u ◦ fdp ≥ minp∈Q
∫
u ◦ gdp, where Q is a revealed set of priors. The interpretation of
the criterion is however somewhat different. In Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the information
the decision maker might have is not explicitly described and the subjective set of prior Q is
unrestricted. Thus, interpreting the min operator as reflecting “extreme pessimism” relies on
a confusion. Of course, this confusion does not arise in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) or the
subsequent specialized literature on uncertainty or ambiguity aversion (Epstein (1999), Epstein
and Zhang (2001), Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) for instance). But it is often done when
applying this criterion to problems in which data are available and, without caution, the sub-
jective family is implicitly assumed to be equal to the “objective” family, and is then used to
disregard the maxmin criterion as overly pessimistic. Interestingly, Wang (2003) provides the
axiomatic foundation for such an extreme pessimism in presence of objective data. His axiom of
uncertainty aversion is much stronger than ours, as it compares situations that are ranked ac-
cording to set inclusion. Instead, our axiom has bite only when a situation is a center preserving
increase in imprecision over the other one.
Jaffray (1989) considers decision maker that have preferences over beliefs functions, rather
than mere lotteries as in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). Imposing the independence
axiom on these preferences he derives a decision criterion that is the convex combination of the
minimum expected utility and the maximum expected utility. His approach however prevents a
decision maker from behaving as an expected utility maximizer (i.e., as an uncertainty neutral
agent).
Tapking (2003) axiomatizes a representation that is very close to ours. His decision criterion
can be written as follows:
f  g ⇔
∫
C
u ◦ fdν(α,c) ≥
∫
C
u ◦ gdν(α,c).
In this expression, ν(α,c) is a capacity, i.e., a set function from Σ to [0, 1] and
∫
C u ◦ fdν denotes
the Choquet integral of u ◦ f with respect to ν. Furthermore, Tapking’s representation theorem
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requires that the capacity ν(α,c) be such that ν(α,c)(E) = αν(E) + (1 − α)c(E) for any event
E ⊂ Σ, where ν is a capacity, and c a probability distribution.
To see the link with our decision criterion, consider a choice setting in which the informational
setting [P, c] is fixed. Let ν be the capacity defined by: ν(E) = min {p(E) |p ∈ co(P)}, for all
E ⊆ S(P). Clearly, for any α ∈ [0, 1], and c ∈ P, the set function ν(α,c) defined by ν(α,c)(E) =
αν(E) + (1− α)c(E) is a capacity with non-empty core. Therefore, in that case, the expression
in Theorem 2 can be written as:∫
C
u ◦ fdν(α,c) ≥
∫
C
u ◦ gdν(α,c)
since the Choquet integral of u ◦ f with respect to a convex capacity is equal to the minimal
expected utility of f with respect to probability distributions in the core of the capacity (see
Schmeidler (1986)). Thus, Tapking’s criterion is similar to ours. However, his setup is quite
different. Tapking starts with a decision maker who behaves in accordance with the Choquet
expected utility model of Schmeidler (1989). Using axioms not only on a prior preference
relation, but also on updated preferences, he derives an explicit definition of the capacity used
by a given decision maker. This capacity is characterized by α, ν and c, which are revealed
parameters. It must be stressed that this capacity is essentially of a subjective nature, and is
deduced from the decision maker behavior. Tapking (2003) furthermore provides an appealing
interpretation of the revealed parameters. c is interpreted as the decision maker’s subjective
probability judgement, whereas ν represents his subjective uncertainty. It describes the set of
probability measures among which, according to the decision maker, lies the true probability
measure. The size of core(ν) can therefore be seen as a measure of the confidence the decision
maker’s has towards his prior probability judgement. Finally, Tapking interprets the coefficient
α, as we do, i.e., as a parameter of uncertainty aversion.
Finally, we should mention Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2003)’s work. They, too, take
the view that some piece of information may be given to the decision maker, under the form
of a possible set of priors P. They derive an axiomatic representation that can be described as
follows. In order to evaluate an act, the decision maker first computes its Expected Utility for all
probabilities measures in P. Then, he computes the expectation of an increasing transformation
of these evaluations, with respects to a subjective second-order probability measure over P. In
other words, the decision maker prefers an act f to an act g if:
Eµφ(Epu ◦ f) ≥ Eµφ(Epu ◦ g)
where E is the expectation operator, u is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, φ is
an increasing transformation, and µ is a subjective probability distribution over the set P of
probability measures p that are relevant. Here, φ describe the decision maker’s attitude towards
imprecision: it therefore plays a role similar to that of F[P,c] in our model. On the other hand,
the couple (P, µ) can be compared to our information [P, c] (although µ is of subjective nature
in their model.)
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4.2 Concluding remarks
We have axiomatized a decision criterion that links the set of priors revealed by choice behavior
in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) to the available information. Our approach is based on the
idea that the latter can be represented through a set of priors together with a reference prior, as
in Hansen and Sargent (2002) and Wang (2003). However, contrary to Wang (2003), our main
axiom of aversion towards information imprecision is sufficiently weak to enable us to model a
wide array of behavior, from full pessimism (maxmin over the entire set of priors) to imprecision
neutrality (expected utility with respect to the reference prior). This approach, based on a
description of information independent of the choice behavior of the decision maker, parallels
the usual approach to risk, in which risk aversion is based on second order stochastic dominance.
Our hope is that it will provide a useful benchmark in economics to pursue comparative statics
exercise, in which the precision of the information is changed. Hence, the framework seems
susceptible to be applied to study a wide range of questions, such as the impact of information
campaign on choices, the reaction of markets after say, central bank announcements, and to
provide some guidance in environmental policies or in issues like new sanitary “risks” (like the
mad cow disease for instance).
Strictly speaking, our model is meant to deal with situations in which there exists an an-
chor which is part of the description of the information given to the decision maker. This,
we argue, is representative of three types of situations: standard practice in econometrics and
statistical inference (Example 3), expert committees (Example 4), sub-population and second
order distribution. The three situations described can be taken as representative of situations
in which there is an external criterion, to which the decision maker adheres, which determines
the information he’ll use. A fourth situation is when the decision maker adheres to “Laplace
principle of insufficient reason”. This amounts to use the uniform distribution as the center,
absent any further information. For instance, in Ellsberg’s three color urn example, a lot of
individuals would agree that the distribution (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3) has a particular salience and would take
this as the anchor for the set of distributions. Our model can then be used to represent these
agents’ preferences. However, as well-known, the principle of insufficient reason has been widely
criticized. For example, assume that the decision maker knows that the exchange rate between
say US-dollars and Sterling will be between 1USD=.5£ and 1USD=1£. The principle of insuf-
ficient reason would yield an “average” estimate of 1USD=.75£. Now, consider the alternative,
equivalent, representation of the possible exchange rate by saying that the exchange rate will
be between 1£=1USD and 1£=2USD. Then, the average estimate would be 1USD=23£. Thus,
applying the principle of insufficient reason to these two logically equivalent representations of
the same information leads to different averages. If one feels, with reason according to us, that
this is a problem, then one should reject the use of the principle of insufficient reason and adopt
an axiom a` la Cohen and Jaffray (1980), stating that, in the example above, the representation
of the problem should have no consequence on the choice of the agent. But this type of axiom
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prevents the decision maker from being expected utility maximizer (or even probabilistically
sophisticated), and thus excludes imprecision neutrality from our setting. Another route, that
we develop in ongoing research, is to address the problem directly and axiomatize a decision
criterion in situations in which the available information does not allow to identify an anchor.
The notion of aversion towards imprecision has then to be modified.
20
Appendix
We start with an extension of the multiple prior model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
taking into account the information given to the decision maker (Theorem 4 below) and then
use it to prove Theorem 1. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) have six axioms, four of which are
already included in our construction (Axioms 1, 5, 6, and 7). The other two are:
Axiom 11 (Certainty-Independence) For all f, g ∈ A, h ∈ Ac, [P, c] ∈ S, α ∈]0, 1[,
(f, [P, c])  (g, [P, c])⇔ (αf + (1− α)h, [P, c])  (αg + (1− α)h, [P, c])
Axiom 12 (Uncertainty aversion) For all f, g ∈ A, [P, c] ∈ S, and all α ∈]0, 1[,
(f, [P, c]) ∼ (g, [P, c])⇒ (αf + (1− α)g, [P, c])  (f, [P, c])
Gilboa and Schmeidler have proved that Axioms 1, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12 hold if, and only if, for all
[P, c] there exist an unique (up to a positive linear transformation) affine function u[P,c] : Y → R,
and an unique, non-empty, closed and convex set F[P,c] of probability measures on 2S , such that
for all f, g ∈ A, (f, [P, c])  (g, [P, c]) if and only if:
min
p∈F[P,c]
∫
u[P,c] ◦ fdp ≥ min
p∈F[P,c]
∫
u[P,c] ◦ gdp.
In the next theorem, we extend the representation for variable [P, c].
Theorem 4 Axioms 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 11, and 12 hold iff there exists an unique (up to a positive
linear transformation) affine function u : Y → R, and for all [P, c] ∈ S, there exists a unique,
non-empty, closed and convex set F[P,c] of finitely additive probability measures on 2S such that:
1. For all p ∈ F[P,c], p(S(P)) = 1,
2. For all ϕ onto mapping from S to S, F[P,c]ϕ =
(F[P,c])ϕ,
and such that for all f, g ∈ A, (f, [Pi, ci])  (g, [Pj , cj ]) iff:
min
p∈F[Pi,ci]
∫
u ◦ fdp ≥ min
p∈F[Pj ,cj ]
∫
u ◦ gdp.
Proof. [Theorem 4]
The necessity part of the theorem is straightforward to verify. We therefore only prove
sufficiency.
Let [Pi, ci] and [Pj , cj ] be two given situations in S. Gilboa and Schmeidler’s representation
theorem implies that the decision maker is an expected utility maximizer over constant acts.
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Axiom 2 implies that u[Pi,ci] and u[Pj ,cj ] represent the same expected utility over constant acts
(which implies that `[Pi,ci]=`[Pj ,cj ]=`). Hence, they can be taken to be equal, i.e., u[Pi,ci] =
u[Pj ,cj ] = u.
To show that the representation can be extended to compare acts associated to different
informational situations, let (f, [Pi, ci])  (g, [Pj , cj ]). Since S(Pi) and S(Pj) are finite and f(s)
and g(s) have finite support, there exist x and x in X such that for all s ∈ S(Pi) ∪ S(Pj), for
all x ∈ Supp(f(s)) ∪ Supp(g(s)), δx ` δx ` δx. Hence, by Axioms 2 and 6 we know that
(kx, [Pi, ci])  (f, [Pi, ci]) 
(
kx, [Pi, ci]
)
and (kx, [Pj , cj ])  (g, [Pj , cj ]) 
(
kx, [Pj , cj ]
)
where
kx (resp. kx) is the constant act giving δx (resp. δx) in all states. By Axioms 1 and 5, there
exists λi such that (f, [Pi, ci]) ∼ (λikx + (1− λi)kx, [Pi, ci]). Similarly, there exists λj such that
(g, [Pj , cj ]) ∼ (λjkx + (1− λj)kx, [Pj , cj ]). Thus,
(f, [Pi, ci])  (g, [Pj , cj ]) ⇔ (λikx + (1− λi)kx, [Pi, ci])  (λjkx + (1− λj)kx, [Pj , cj ])
⇔ λikx + (1− λi)kx ` λjkx + (1− λj)kx
Now, (f, [Pi, ci]) ∼ (λikx+(1−λi)kx, [Pi, ci]) implies that minp∈F[Pi,ci]
∫
u◦ fdp = u(λiδx+(1−
λi)δx). We also have that minp∈F[Pj ,cj]
∫
u◦gdp = u(λjδx+(1−λj)δx) and u(λiδx+(1−λi)δx) ≥
u(λjδx + (1− λj)δx), which implies that
min
p∈F[Pi,ci]
∫
u ◦ fdp ≥ min
p∈F[Pj ,cj]
∫
u ◦ gdp
We now turn to Condition 1. Let p∗ ∈ F[P,c] and suppose that p∗(S(P)) = q 6= 1. Consider
x and x in X such that u(δx) > u(δx) and let f be defined by f(s) = δx for all s ∈ S(P),
f(s) = δx for all s ∈ S\S(P), and g by g(s) = δx for all s ∈ S. Then
min
p∈F[P,c]
∫
u ◦ fdp ≤
∫
u ◦ fdp∗ = qu(x) + (1− q)u(x) < u(x) = min
p∈F[P,c]
∫
u ◦ gdp
and thus (g, [P, c])  (f, [P, c]) which is a violation of Axiom 2 since g = fS(P)g. Thus, for all
p ∈ F[P,c], p(S(P)) = 1.
We finally prove Condition 2. Let ϕ be an onto mapping from S to S and [P, c] ∈ S.
We will first prove that F[P,c]ϕ ⊆
(F[P,c])ϕ. Assume there exists p∗ ∈ F[P,c]ϕ such that
p∗ /∈ (F[P,c])ϕ. Since F[P,c] is a convex set, (F[P,c])ϕ is also convex. Hence, using a separation ar-
gument, we know that there exists a function φ : S → R such that ∫ φdp∗ < minp∈(F[P,c])ϕ ∫ φdp.
Since S(Pϕ) is a finite set, there exist numbers a, b with a > 0, such that ∀s ∈ S(Pϕ),
(aφ(s) + b) ∈ u(Y ). Then, for all s ∈ S(Pϕ) there exists y(s) ∈ Y such that u(y(s)) = aφ(s)+ b.
Define f by f(s) = y(s) for all s ∈ S(Pϕ), f(s) = δx for all s ∈ S\S(Pϕ), where x ∈ X. Define
g by gϕ = f . Since for all p ∈ F[P,c],
∫
u ◦ gdp = ∫ u ◦ gϕdpϕ, we have:
min
p∈F[P,c]
∫
u ◦ gdp = min
p∈(F[P,c])ϕ
∫
u ◦ gϕdp = min
p∈(F[P,c])ϕ
∫
u ◦ fdp
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Condition 1 implies that minp∈(F[P,c])ϕ
∫
u ◦ f = minp∈(F[P,c])ϕ
∫
(aφ+ b)dp. But:
min
p∈(F[P,c])ϕ
∫
(aφ+ b)dp >
∫
(aφ+ b)dp∗ ≥ min
p∈F[P,c]ϕ
∫
u ◦ fdp
and therefore (g, [P, c])  (f, [P, c]ϕ) which is a violation of Axiom 2.
A similar argument may be use to prove that F[P,c]ϕ ⊇
(F[P,c])ϕ.
Lemma 1 Let [P, c] ∈ S and α ∈ [0, 1]. Let ϕ be a bijection from S(P) to S′, with S′∩S(P) = ∅.
Then, [P, c](α,ϕ)M is a center preserving increase in imprecision of [P, c](α,ϕ)R
Proof. [Lemma 1] Straightforward
Lemma 2 Assume that Axioms 2 and 3 hold. Let [P, c] ∈ S, f, g ∈ A, S′ ⊂ N such that
S′ ∩ S(P) = ∅, and ϕ a bijection from S to S such that ϕ(S(P)) = S′. Then,
∀α ∈ [0, 1], (f, [P, c]) ∼ (g, [P, c])⇒ (f, [P, c]) ∼ (g, [P, c]) ∼
(
fS(P)gϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)M
)
Proof. [Lemma 2] Let (f, [P, c]) and (g, [P, c]) be given, such that (f, [P, c]) ∼ (g, [P, c]).
Without loss of generality, let S(P) = {1, ..., n}.
Consider the bijection ϕ : S → S such that ϕ(s) = s+ n for all s ∈ {1, ..., n}, ϕ(s) = s− n
for all s ∈ {n+ 1, ..., 2n} and ϕ(s) = s for all s > 2n.
Axiom 2 implies: (g, [P, c]) ∼ (gS(P)gϕ, [P, c]) and (f, [P, c]) ∼ (fS(P)gϕ, [P, c]). Therefore,
(gS(P)gϕ, [P, c]) ∼ (fS(P)gϕ, [P, c]). Since S(P) ∩ S(Pϕ) = ∅, and (gS(P)gϕ)(s) = (fS(P)gϕ)(s)
for all s ∈ S(Pϕ), Axiom 3 implies that (f, [P, c]) ∼ (g, [P, c]) if and only if:(
gS(P)gϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)M
)
∼
(
fS(P)gϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)M
)
Now, let ψ : S → S be an onto mapping such that ψ(s) = s for all s ∈ {1, ..., n}, and ψ(s) = s−n
for all s > n. The act gS(P)gϕ is ψ−measurable. Thus Axiom 2 implies
(
gS(P)gϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)M
)
∼(
gS(P)gϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)M
)ψ
. But
(
[P, c](α,ϕ)M
)ψ
= [P, c] and (gS(P)gϕ)ψ = g(s) for all s ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Therefore,
(g, [P, c]) ∼
(
gS(P)gϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)M
)
from which it follows: (g, [P, c]) ∼
(
fS(P)gϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)M
)
, the desired result.
Lemma 3 Axioms 2, 3, 4, and 8 imply Axioms 11 and 12.
Proof. [Lemma 3] We first check Axiom 11. Let (f, [P, c])  (g, [P, c]) and h ∈ Ac.
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Let ϕ : S → S be a bijection such that S(Pϕ)∩S(P) = ∅ and ψ : S → S be an onto mapping
such that ψ(s) = s for all s ∈ S(P), and (ψ ◦ ϕ)(S(P)) = {s∗}, with s∗ ∈ S \ S(P). Finally, let
p∗ be the probability distribution defined by p∗(s∗) = 1.
By Axiom 2,
(αf + (1− α)h, [P, c]) ∼ (αfS(P)h+ (1− α)h, [P, c])
Since (αfS(P)h)(s) = h(s) for all s ∈ S \ S(P), Axiom 4 implies:
(αfS(P)h+ (1− α)h, [P, c]) ∼
(
fS(P)hϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)R
)
Therefore,
(αf + (1− α)h, [P, c]) ∼
(
fS(P)hϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)R
)
Since fS(P)hϕ is ψ−measurable, Axiom 2 implies:(
fS(P)hϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)R
)
∼
(
fS(P)hϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)R
)ψ
and therefore:
(αf + (1− α)h, [P, c]) ∼
(
fS(P)hϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)R
)ψ
(1)
The same reasoning holds with g instead of f , and therefore we also have:
(αg + (1− α)h, [P, c]) ∼
(
gS(P)hϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)R
)ψ
(2)
On the other hand, by Axiom 2,
(f, [P, c]) ∼
(
(fS(P)hϕ)ψ, [P, c]
)
and (g, [P, c]) ∼
(
(gS(P)hϕ)ψ, [P, c]
)
Therefore, (f, [P, c])  (g, [P, c]) if and only if:(
(fS(P)hϕ)ψ, [P, c]
)

(
(gS(P)hϕ)ψ, [P, c]
)
Since
(
fS(P)h
)ψ (s) = (gS(P)hϕ)ψ (s) for all s ∈ S \ S(P) and s∗ ∈ S \ S(P), Axiom 3 implies
that (f, [P, c])  (g, [P, c]) if and only if:(
(fS(P)hϕ)ψ, α[P, c] + (1− α)[{p∗}, p∗]
)

(
(gS(P)hϕ)ψ, α[P, c] + (1− α)[{p∗}, p∗]
)
(3)
But observe that
(
[P, c](α,ϕ)R
)ψ
= α[P, c]+(1−α)[{p∗}, p∗]. Therefore, equation (3) is equivalent
to: (
fS(P)hϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)R
)ψ  (gS(P)hϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)R )ψ (4)
Finally, substituting equations (1) and (2) in (4), we obtain that (f, [P, c])  (g, [P, c]) if and
only if:
(αf + (1− α)h, [P, c])  (αg + (1− α)h, [P, c])
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thus proving Axiom 11.
We now check that Axiom 12 holds as well. Let (f, [P, c]) and (g, [P, c]) be given, such that
(f, [P, c]) ∼ (g, [P, c]). According to Lemma 2, we have that
(f, [P, c]) ∼ (g, [P, c]) ∼
(
fS(P)gϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)M
)
In Lemma 1, it was shown that [P, c](α,ϕ)M was more imprecise than [P, c](α,ϕ)R . Thus Axiom
8 implies that (
fS(P)gϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)R
)

(
fS(P)gϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)M
)
Since by Axiom 4, we have that (αf + (1− α)g, [P, c]) ∼
(
fS(P)gϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)R
)
, it follows that
(αf + (1− α)g, [P, c])  (f, [P, c]) ∼ (g, [P, c])
Hence, Axiom 12 is satisfied.
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 1.
Proof. [Theorem 1]
1. Sufficiency
By Lemma 3, we know that Axioms 2 to 4 and 8 imply Axioms 11 and 12. Hence, we can
invoke Theorem 4 to prove that there exists an unique (up to a positive affine transformation)
affine function u : Y → R, and for all [Pi, ci] , [Pj , cj ] ∈ S, there exist unique, non-empty, closed
and convex sets F[Pi,ci] and F[Pj ,cj ] of finitely additive probability measures on 2S , such that for
all f, g ∈ A, (f, [Pi, ci])  (g, [Pj , cj ]) if, and only if:
min
p∈F[Pi,ci]
∫
u ◦ fdp ≥ min
p∈F[Pj ,cj]
∫
u ◦ gdp
Furthermore, for all ϕ onto mapping from S to S, F[Pi,ci]ϕ =
{
pϕ|p ∈ F[Pi,ci]
}
. We will now
show that the Axioms imply conditions 1 to 5 of the Theorem.
Condition 1
Suppose Condition 1 does not hold, i.e., there exists [P, c] ∈ S such that F[P,c] * co(P). Then,
there exists p∗ ∈ F[P,c] such that p∗ /∈ co (P). Since co (P) is a convex set, using a separation
argument, we know there exists a function φ : S → R such that ∫ φdp∗ < minp∈co(P) ∫ φdp.
Since Axiom 9 implies that (f, [P, c]) ∼ (fS(P)g, [P, c]), we have that Condition 1 in Theorem
4 holds and thus, for all p ∈ F[P,c], p(S(P)) = 1. Thus Supp(p∗) ⊆ S(P) and since S(P) is a
finite set, there exist numbers a, b with a > 0, such that ∀s ∈ S(P), (aφ(s) + b) ∈ u(Y ). Then,
for all s ∈ S(P) there exists y(s) ∈ Y such that u(y(s)) = aφ(s)+ b. Define f by f(s) = y(s) for
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all s ∈ S(P), f(s) = δx for all s ∈ S\S(P) where x ∈ X. Note that minp∈co(P)
∫
(aφ+ b)dp ∈ Y
and thus there exists y∗ such that u(y∗) = minp∈co(P)
∫
(aφ+ b)dp. Define g by g(s) = y∗ for all
s ∈ S. Observe that for all p ∈ ∆(S) such that p ∈ P,∫
u ◦ fdp ≥ min
p∈co(P)
∫
u ◦ fdp = min
p∈co(P)
∫
(aφ+ b)dp = u(y∗) =
∫
u ◦ gdp
So for all p ∈ ∆(S) such that p ∈ P, (f, [{p}, p])  (g, [{p}, p]). Yet
min
p∈F[P,c]
∫
u◦fdp ≤
∫
u◦fdp∗ =
∫
(aφ+b)dp < min
p∈co(P)
∫
(aφ+b)dp = u(y∗) = min
p∈F[P,c]
∫
u◦gdp
and thus (f, [P, c]) ≺ (g, [P, c]) which is a violation of Axiom 9.
Condition 2
Condition 2 was proved in Theorem 4.
Condition 3
Consider [Pi, ci] , [Pj , cj ] ∈ S such that S(Pi) ∩ S(Pj) = ∅ and α ∈ [0, 1].
Step 1. Fα[Pi,ci]+(1−α)[Pj ,cj ] ⊇ αF[Pi,ci] + (1− α)F[Pj ,cj ]
Suppose that there exist p∗i ∈ F[Pi,ci] and p∗j ∈ F[Pj ,cj ] such that p∗ = αp∗i + (1 − α)p∗j /∈
Fα[Pi,ci]+(1−α)[Pj ,cj ]. Since Fα[Pi,ci]+(1−α)[Pj ,cj ] is a convex set, using a separation argument,
we know there exists a function φ : S → R such that ∫ φdp∗ < minp∈Fα[Pi,ci]+(1−α)[Pj ,cj ] ∫ φdp.
Since S(Pi) and S(Pj) are finite sets, there exist numbers a, b with a > 0, such that ∀s ∈
S(Pi) ∪ S(Pj), (aφ(s) + b) ∈ u(Y ).2 Then, for all s ∈ S(Pi) ∪ S(Pj) there exists y(s) ∈
Y such that u(y(s)) = aφ(s) + b. Define f by f(s) = y(s) for all s ∈ S(Pi) ∪ S(Pj),
f(s) = δx for all s ∈ S\ (S(Pi) ∪ S(Pj)), where x ∈ X. Since for all p ∈ Fα[Pi,ci]+(1−α)[Pj ,cj ],
p (S(αPi + (1− α)Pj)) = p (S(Pi) ∪ S(Pj)) = 1,
min
p∈Fα[Pi,ci]+(1−α)[Pj ,cj ]
∫
u ◦ fdp = min
p∈Fα[Pi,ci]+(1−α)[Pj ,cj ]
∫
(aφ+ b)dp
>
∫
(aφ+ b)dp∗ = α
∫
u ◦ fdp∗i + (1− α)
∫
u ◦ fdp∗j (5)
Since
∫
u ◦ fdp∗i ∈ u(Y ) and
∫
u ◦ fdp∗j ∈ u(Y ) there exist yi, yj ∈ Y such that u(yi) =∫
u ◦ fdp∗i and u(yj) =
∫
u ◦ fdp∗j . Define g by g(s) = yi for all s ∈ S(Pi), g(s) = yj for all
s ∈ S\S(Pi). Since for all p ∈ F[Pi,ci], p(S(Pi)) = 1 we have that
min
p∈F[Pi,ci]
∫
u ◦ gdp = u(yi) =
∫
u ◦ fdp∗i ≥ min
p∈F[Pi,ci]
∫
u ◦ fdp
and
min
p∈F[Pj ,cj ]
∫
u ◦ gdp = u(yj) =
∫
u ◦ fdp∗j ≥ min
p∈F[Pj ,cj ]
∫
u ◦ fdp
2Completeness and continuity imply that u(Y ) is convex.
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thus (g, [Pi, ci])  (f, [Pi, ci]) and (g, [Pj , cj ])  (f, [Pj , cj ]). Furthermore, Axiom 2 implies:
(g, [Pi, ci]) 
(
fS(Pi)g, [Pi, ci]
) ∼ (f, [Pi, ci]) (6)(
fS(Pj)g, [Pj , cj ]
)
∼ (g, [Pj , cj ])  (f, [Pj , cj ]) (7)
But by Axiom 3, equation (6) implies:
(g, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ]) 
(
fS(Pi)g, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ]
)
Similarly, equation (7) implies:(
fS(Pi)g, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ]
)  (f, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ])
Therefore,
(g, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ])  (f, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ]) (8)
On the other hand, since
α
∫
u ◦ fdp∗i + (1− α)
∫
u ◦ fdp∗j = αu(yi) + (1− α)u(yj) =
∫
u ◦ gd(αci + (1− α)cj)
equation (5) implies:
(f, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ])  (g, [{αci + (1− α)cj}, αci + (1− α)cj ])
But α[Pi, ci] + (1 − α)[Pj , cj ] is a center preserving increase in imprecision of [{αci + (1 −
α)cj}, αci+(1−α)cj ]. Therefore, Axiom 8 implies that (g, [{αci+(1−α)cj}, αci+(1−αcj)]) 
(g, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ]) and hence:
(f, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ])  (g, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ])
a contradiction with equation (8).
Step 2. Fα[Pi,ci]+(1−α)[Pj ,cj ] ⊆ αF[Pi,ci] + (1− α)F[Pj ,cj ]
Suppose that there exists p∗ ∈ Fα[Pi,ci]+(1−α)[Pj ,cj ] such that p∗ /∈ αF[Pi,ci] + (1− α)F[Pj ,cj ].
We first show that p∗ (S(Pi)) = α. Assume that such is not the case, for instance, p∗ (S(Pi)) >
α. There exist y1, y2, y3 ∈ Y such that αu(y1) + (1 − α)u(y2) = u(y3).3 Define f by f(s) = y1
for all s ∈ S(Pi), f(s) = y2 for all s ∈ S\S(Pi) and g by g(s) = y3 for all s ∈ S. Then
minp∈Fα[Pi,ci]+(1−α)[Pj ,cj ]
∫
u ◦ fdp ≤ ∫ u ◦ fdp∗
< αu(y1) + (1− α)u(y2)
= u(y3) = minp∈Fα[Pi,ci]+(1−α)[Pj ,cj ]
∫
u ◦ gdp
and thus
(f, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ]) ≺ (g, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ]) (9)
3Existence can be proved by using Axioms 1, 5, 7.
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Without loss of generality, let S(Pi) = {1, ..., n1} and S(Pj) = {n1 + 1, ..., n1 + n2}. Con-
sider the onto mapping ψ : S → S such that ψ(s) = 1 for all s ∈ {1, ..., n1}, ψ(s) = 2 for all
s ∈ {n1 + 1, ..., n1 + n2}, ψ(s) = s+ 2− (n1 + n2) for all s > n1 + n2. Since f is ψ-measurable,
Axiom 2 implies that (f, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ]) ∼ (f, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ])ψ. Observe
that (α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ])ψ = {p} where p ∈ ∆(S) is such that p(1) = α and p(2) = 1−α.
Therefore, (f, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ]) ∼
(
fψ, [{p}, p]). Note also that [{p}, p] is the (α, ϕ)-
replication of [{δ1}, δ1] with ϕ the bijection such that ϕ (1) = 2, ϕ (2) = 1, ϕ (s) = s for all
s > 2. Define h by h(s) = αy1 + (1− α)y2 for all s ∈ S.
By Axiom 2,
(
fψ, [{p}, p]) ∼ ((fψ){1,2} h, [{p}, p]). By Axiom 4, ((fψ){1,2} h, [{p}, p]) ∼
(h, [{δ1}, δ1]). Since minp∈F[{δ1},δ1]
∫
u◦hdp = αu(y1)+(1−α)u(y2) = u(y3), we have (h, [{δ1}, δ1]) ∼
(g, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ]). Thus we obtain
(f, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ]) ∼ (g, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ])
which contradicts equation (9).
Therefore, p∗ (S(Pi)) = (1 − p∗ (S(Pj)) = α. Define p∗k ∈ ∆(S) by p∗k(s) = p
∗(s)
p∗(S(Pk)) if
s ∈ S(Pk), p∗k(s) = 0 otherwise. There exists k ∈ {i, j} such that p∗k /∈ F[Pk,ck] (otherwise, we
would have p∗ ∈ αF[Pi,ci]+(1−α)F[Pj ,cj ]). Suppose for instance that p∗i /∈ F[Pi,ci]. Since F[Pi,ci]
is a convex set, using a separation argument, we know there exists a function φ : S → R such
that
∫
φdp∗i < minp∈F[Pi,ci]
∫
φdp. Since S(Pi) is a finite set, there exist numbers a, b with a > 0,
such that ∀s ∈ S(Pi), (aφ(s) + b) ∈ u(Y ). Then, for all s ∈ S(Pi) there exists y(s) ∈ Y such
that u(y(s)) = aφ(s) + b.
There also exists y∗ ∈ Y such that u(y∗) = minp∈F[Pi,ci]
∫
(aφ+ b) dp. Define f by f(s) = y(s)
for all s ∈ S(Pi), f(s) = y∗ for all s ∈ S\S(Pi) and define g by g(s) = y∗ for all s ∈ S. Since
Condition 1 applies, we have that
min
p∈F[Pi,ci]
∫
u ◦ fdp = min
p∈F[Pj ,cj ]
∫
u ◦ fdp
min
p∈F[Pi,ci]
∫
u ◦ gdp = min
p∈F[Pj ,cj ]
∫
u ◦ gdp = u(y∗)
Thus (f, [Pi, ci]) ∼ (g, [Pi, ci]) ∼ (f, [Pj , cj ]) ∼ (g, [Pj , cj ]). By Axiom 2, (f, [Pi, ci]) ∼
(
fS(Pi)g, [Pi, ci]
)
.
By Axiom 3, (
fS(Pi)g, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ]
) ∼ (f, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ])
and (
fS(Pi)g, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ]
) ∼ (g, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ])
establishing that
(f, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ]) ∼ (g, α[Pi, ci] + (1− α)[Pj , cj ]) (10)
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Since g is a constant act, we have minp∈Fα[Pi,ci]+(1−α)[Pj ,cj ]
∫
u ◦ gdp = u(y∗). Yet,
min
p∈Fα[Pi,ci]+(1−α)[Pj ,cj ]
∫
u ◦ fdp ≤
∫
u ◦ fdp∗ = α
∫
u ◦ fdp∗i + (1− α)
∫
u ◦ fdp∗j
= α
∫
(aφ+ b) dp∗i + (1− α)u(y∗)
< α min
p∈F[Pi,ci]
∫
(aφ+ b) dp+ (1− α)u(y∗) = u(y∗)
which contradicts equation (10).
Condition 4
Let [Pi, ci] , [Pj , cj ] ∈ S where [Pi, ci] is a center preserving increase in imprecision of [Pj , cj ]
(and hence ci = cj). Suppose that F[Pi,ci] + F[Pj ,cj ] and thus, that there exists p∗ ∈ F[Pj ,cj ]
such that p∗ /∈ F[Pi,ci]. Since F[Pi,ci] is a convex set, using a separation argument, we know
there exists a function φ : S → R such that ∫ φdp∗ < minp∈F[Pi,ci] ∫ φdp. Since S(Pi) is a finite
set, there exist numbers a, b with a > 0, such that ∀s ∈ S(Pi), (aφ(s) + b) ∈ u(Y ). Then, for
all s ∈ S(Pi) there exists y(s) ∈ Y such that u(y(s)) = aφ(s) + b. Define f by f(s) = y(s) for
all s ∈ S(Pi), f(s) = δx for all s ∈ S\S(Pi), where x ∈ X. Note that since [Pi, ci] is a center
preserving increase in imprecision of [Pj , cj ], S(Pj) ⊆ S(Pi) and thus we have
min
p∈F[Pj ,cj ]
∫
u ◦ fdp ≤
∫
u ◦ fdp∗ =
∫
(aφ+ b) dp∗
< min
p∈F[Pi,ci]
∫
(aφ+ b) dp = min
p∈F[Pi,ci]
∫
u ◦ fdp
which implies that (f, [Pi, ci])  (f, [Pj , cj ]) which is a violation of Axiom 8.
Condition 5
Let [P, c] ∈ S , and [P, c](α,ϕ)R a replication (α ∈ ]0, 1[).4 We know by Lemma 1 that [P, c](α,ϕ)R
is less imprecise than [P, c](α,ϕ)M and thus, since Condition 4 holds, F[P,c](α,ϕ)R ⊆ F[P,c](α,ϕ)M and by
Condition 1, F
[P,c](α,ϕ)R
= αF[P,c] + (1− α)F[P,c]ϕ. Thus
F
[P,c](α,ϕ)R
⊆ αF[P,c] + (1− α)F[P,c]ϕ
Step 1. F
[P,c](α,ϕ)R
⊆ (F[P,c])ϕ
Suppose that there exists p∗ ∈ F
[P,c](α,ϕ)R
such that p∗ /∈ (F[P,c])ϕ. Then, since p∗ ∈ αF[P,c]+
(1−α)F[P,c]ϕ and since Condition 2 holds, there exist p∗1, p∗2 ∈ F[P,c] such that, p∗ = αp∗1 + (1−
α)p∗ϕ2 . Note that p
∗
1 6= p∗2 since otherwise we would have p∗ ∈
(F[P,c])(α,ϕ).
Thus, there exist E1, E2 ⊂ S(P) such that E1∩E2 = ∅, E1∪E2 = S(P), p∗1(E1) > p∗2(E1) (and
thus p∗1(E2) = (1− p∗1(E1)) < p∗2(E2) = (1− p∗1(E2))). There also exist x and x u(δx) > u(δx).
4For α = 0 we have trivially [P, c](0,ϕ)R = [P, c] and for α = 1, Condition 5 can be deduced from Condition 2.
29
Assume first that α ≥ 12 . Define f by f(s) =
(
2α−1
α
)
δx +
(
1−α
α
)
δx for all s ∈ E1, f(s) = δx
for all s ∈ E2, f(s) = αδx+(1−α)δx for all s ∈ S\S(P) and define g by g(s) = δx for all s ∈ E1,
g(s) = δx for all s ∈ E2, g(s) = αδx+(1−α)δx for all s ∈ S\ {s1, s2}. One can easily check that
(αf + (1− α)g) (s) = αδx + (1− α)δx for all s ∈ S(P). And thus
min
p∈F[P,c]
∫
u ◦ (αf + (1− α)g) dp = u (αδx + (1− α)δx) = αu(δx) + (1− α)u(δx)
Consider now fS(P)gϕ. We have:
min
p∈F
[P,c](α,ϕ)
R
∫
u ◦ fS(P)gϕdp ≤
∫
u ◦ fS(P)gϕdp∗ = α
∫
u ◦ fdp∗1 + (1− α)
∫
u ◦ gdp∗2
= α
[
p∗1(E1)u(
(
2α− 1
α
)
δx +
(
1− α
α
)
δx) + p∗1(E2)u(δx)
]
+ (1− α) [p∗2(E1)u(δx) + p∗2(E2)u(δx)]
= αu(δx) + (1− α)u(δx)
+ (1− α) (p∗2(E1)− p∗1(E1)) (u(δx)− u(δx))
< αu(δx) + (1− α)u(δx)
and thus (αf + (1− α)g, [P, c]) 
(
fS(P)gϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)R
)
which is violation of Axiom 4.
A similar reasoning holds in the case α ≤ 12 .
Step 2. F
[P,c](α,ϕ)R
⊇ {αp+ (1− α)pϕ|p ∈ F[P,c]}
Suppose that there exists p∗ ∈ F[P,c] such that αp∗ + (1− α)p∗ϕ /∈ F[P,c](α,ϕ)R . Since we just
proved that
F
[P,c](α,ϕ)R
⊆ {αp+ (1− α)pϕ|p ∈ F[P,c]}
for all p ∈ F
[P,c](α,ϕ)R
, there exists pϕ−1 ∈ F[P,c] such that p = αpϕ−1 + (1−α)
(
pϕ−1
)ϕ. Consider
F =
{
pϕ−1 |p ∈ F[P,c](α,ϕ)R
}
. Since F
[P,c](α,ϕ)R
is convex, F is also convex and p∗ /∈ F . Hence,
using a separation argument, we know there exists a function φ : S → R such that ∫ φdp∗ <
minp∈F
∫
φdp. Since S(P) is a finite set, there exist numbers a, b with a > 0, such that ∀s ∈ S(P),
(aφ(s) + b) ∈ u(Y ). Then, for all s ∈ S(P) there exists y(s) ∈ Y such that u(y(s)) = aφ(s) + b.
Define f by f(s) = y(s) for all s ∈ S(P), f(s) = δx for all s ∈ S\S(Pϕ), where x ∈ X. Observe
that for all p ∈ F
[P,c](α,ϕ)R
,
∫
u ◦ fS(P)fϕdp =
∫
u ◦ fS(P)fϕd
(
αpϕ−1 + (1− α)
(
pϕ−1
)ϕ)
= α
∫
u ◦ fdpϕ−1 + (1− α)
∫
u ◦ fϕd (pϕ−1)ϕ
=
∫
u ◦ fdpϕ−1 =
∫
(aφ+ b)dpϕ−1
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Thus
min
p∈F[P,c]
∫
u ◦ fdp ≤
∫
u ◦ fdp∗ =
∫
(aφ+ b)dp∗ < min
p∈F
∫
(aφ+ b)dp
= min
p∈F
∫
u ◦ fdp = min
p∈F
[P,c](α,ϕ)
R
∫
u ◦ fS(P)fϕdp
which shows that
(
fS(Pfϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)R
)
 (f, [P, c]), a violation of Axiom 4.
Necessity
The axioms to check are Axioms 3, 4, 8, and 9 since the others hold by Theorem 4.
Axiom 3
Consider [Pi, ci] ∈ S, i = 1, 2, 3 such that (S(P1) ∪ S(P2)) ∩ S(P3) = ∅, α ∈ [0, 1], and
f, g ∈ A such that f(s) = g(s) for all s ∈ S(P3). Assume (f, [P1, c1])  (g, [P2, c2]). By
Condition 3, Fα[P1,c1]+(1−α)[P3,c3] = αF[P1,c1] + (1− α)F[P3,c3] we have that
min
p∈Fα[P1,c1]+(1−α)[P3,c3]
∫
u ◦ fdp = min
p∈αF[P1,c1]+(1−α)F[P3,c3]
∫
u ◦ fdp
= α min
p∈F[P1,c1]
∫
u ◦ fdp+ (1− α) min
p∈F[P3,c3]
∫
u ◦ fdp
≥ α min
p∈F[P2,c2]
∫
u ◦ gdp+ (1− α) min
p∈F[P3,c3]
∫
u ◦ fdp
But we have also
min
p∈Fα[P1,c1]+(1−α)[P3,c3]
∫
u ◦ gdp = α min
p∈F[P2,c2]
∫
u ◦ gdp+ (1− α) min
p∈F[P3,c3]
∫
u ◦ fdp
thus (f, α[P1, c1] + (1− α)[P3, c3])  (g, α[P1, c1] + (1− α)[P3, c3]), which proves that Axiom 3
is satisfied.
Axiom 4
Consider [P, c] ∈ S, the replication [P, c](α,ϕ)R , f, g ∈ A such that f(s) = g(s) for all s ∈
S\S(P). Since Condition 5 holds,
min
p∈F
[P,c](α,ϕ)
R
∫
u ◦ fS(P)gϕdp = min
p∈F[P,c]
∫
u ◦ fS(P)gϕd(αp+ (1− α)pϕ)
For all p ∈ F[P,c],∫
u ◦ fS(P)gϕd(αp+ (1− α)pϕ) = α
∫
u ◦ fS(P)gϕdp+ (1− α)
∫
u ◦ fS(P)gϕdpϕ
= α
∫
u ◦ fdp+ (1− α)
∫
u ◦ gdp
=
∫
u ◦ (αf + (1− α)g)dp
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and thus
min
p∈F[P,c]
∫
u ◦ fS(P)gϕd(αp+ (1− α)pϕ) = min
p∈F[P,c]
∫
u ◦ (αf + (1− α)g)dp
which shows that (αf + (1− α)g, [P, c]) ∼
(
fS(P)gϕ, [P, c](α,ϕ)R
)
.
Axiom 8
By Condition 4, if [Pi, ci] is a center preserving increase in imprecision of [Pj , cj ] then
F[Pi,ci] ⊇ F[Pj ,cj ] implies that for all f ∈ A,
min
p∈F[Pi,ci]
∫
u ◦ fdp ≤ min
p∈F[Pj ,cj ]
∫
u ◦ fdp
and thus (f, [Pj , cj ])  (f, [Pi, ci]) which proves that Axiom 8 is satisfied.
Axiom 9
Consider f, g ∈ A and [P, c] ∈ S such that (f, [{p}, p])  (g, [{p}, p]) for all p ∈ P. Remark
that for all p ∈ co (P) there exist p1, p2 ∈ ∆(S) and α ∈ [0, 1] such that p = αp1 + (1 − α)p2.
Thus, ∫
u ◦ fd (αp1 + (1− α)p2) = α
∫
u ◦ fdp1 + (1− α)
∫
u ◦ fdp2
≥ α
∫
u ◦ gdp1 + (1− α)
∫
u ◦ gdp2
=
∫
u ◦ gd (αp1 + (1− α)p2)
and hence
∫
u ◦ fdp ≥ ∫ u ◦ gdp.
Since by Condition 1, F[P,c] ⊆ co (P), for all p ∈ F[P,c],
∫
u ◦ fdp ≥ ∫ u ◦ gdp and thus
minp∈F[P,c]
∫
u ◦ fdp ≥ minp∈F[P,c]
∫
u ◦ gdp which implies that (f, [P, c])  (g, [P, c]).
Proof. [Theorem 2] We introduce first a piece of notation. Let [P, c] be a situation, then
Pα = {pα ∈ ∆(S)|pα = αp+ (1− α)c, p ∈ P}. Pα is the “contraction” of P around its anchor
c, at rate α. In Theorem 2, α min
p∈co(P)
∫
u ◦ fdp+ (1− α) ∫ u ◦ fdc = min
p∈co(Pα)
∫
u ◦ fdp.
Sufficiency
Axioms 8 and 9 are clearly satisfied. By Theorem 1, we know there exist an unique (up to a
positive linear transformation) affine function u : Y → R, and for all [P1, c1] , [P1, c1] ∈ S, there
exist unique, non-empty, closed and convex set F[P1,c1] and F[P2,c2] of probability measures on 2S ,
satisfying Conditions 1 to 5 of Theorem 1 and such that for all f, g ∈ A, (f, [P1, c1])  (g, [P2, c2])
iff:
min
p∈F[P1,c1]
∫
u ◦ fdp ≥ min
p∈F[P2,c2]
∫
u ◦ gdp.
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Step 1.∀ [Pi, ci] ∈ S, ∃αi s.t. F[Pi,ci] = co(Pαii )
Let [Pi, ci] ∈ S. By Condition 1 of Theorem 1, we have that F[Pi,ci] ⊆ co(Pi). On the
other hand, since [Pi, ci] is a center preserving increase in imprecision of [{c}i, ci], Condition 4
of Theorem 1 implies that F[{ci},ci] ⊆ F[Pi,ci] and hence ci ∈ F[Pi,ci].
Remark also that Supp(ci) = S(P0i ) and that for all β, γ ∈ [0, 1] such that β ≥ γ, we have
that co(Pβi ) ⊇ co(Pγi ). Let
β
i
= Sup
{
β|β ∈ [0, 1] and co(Pβi ) ⊆ F[Pi,ci]
}
and
βi = Inf
{
β|β ∈ [0, 1] and co(Pβi ) ⊇ F[Pi,ci]
}
Since for all β ∈ [0, 1], co(Pβi ) and F[Pi,ci] are closed sets, we have that
co(Pβii ) ⊆ F[Pi,ci] ⊆ co(Pβii )
Assume that β
i
< βi. Let β ∈
]
β
i
, βi
[
. Then there exist p1, p2 in co(Pi)\Int (co(Pi))
such that (βp1 + (1− β)c) ∈ F[Pi,ci] and (βp2 + (1− β)ci) /∈ F[Pi,ci].5 Since F[Pi,ci] is a convex
set, using a separation argument, we know there exists a function φ2 : S → R such that∫
φ2d (βp2 + (1− β)ci) < minp∈F[Pi,ci]
∫
φ2dp. Since p1 ∈ co(Pi)\Int (co(Pi)) and since co(Pi)
is a convex set, using a separation argument, we know there exists a function φ1 : S → R such
that
∫
φ1dp1 ≤ minp∈co(Pi)
∫
φ1dp.
Since S(Pi) is a finite set, there exist numbers ai, bi with ai > 0, such that ∀s ∈ S(Pi),
(aiφi(s) + bi) ∈ u(Y ) for i = 1, 2,{
min
p∈co(Pi)
∫
(a1φ1 + b1) dp = min
p∈co(Pi)
∫
(a2φ2 + b2) dp∫
(a1φ1 + b1) dci =
∫
(a2φ2 + b2) dci
Then, for all s ∈ S(Pi) there exists yi(s) ∈ Y such that u(yi(s)) = aiφi(s) + bi. Define f by
f(s) = y1(s) for all s ∈ S(Pi), f(s) = δx for all s ∈ S\S(Pi), where x ∈ X and g by g(s) = y2(s)
for all s ∈ S(Pi), g(s) = δx for all s ∈ S\S(Pi). Thus we have
min
p∈co(Pi)
∫
u ◦ fdp = min
p∈co(Pi)
∫
u ◦ gdp
and ∫
u ◦ fdci =
∫
u ◦ gdci
Since co(Pi) is closed, there exists p ∈ co(Pi) such that min
p∈co(Pi)
∫
u◦gdp = ∫ u◦gdp. Then for all
q ∈ co(Pi), we have that (f, [{q}, q])  (g, [{p}, p]) and thus Axiom 10 implies that (f, [Pi, ci]) 
(g, [Pi, ci]). Similarly, (g, [Pi, ci])  (f, [Pi, ci]), and therefore (f, [Pi, ci]) ∼ (g, [Pi, ci]).
5Such a couple (p1, p2) exists since otherwise, we would have either co(Pβi ) ⊆ F[Pi,ci] or co(Pβi ) ⊇ F[Pi,ci].
33
On the other hand
min
p∈F[Pi,ci]
∫
u ◦ gdp >
∫
u ◦ gd (βp2 + (1− β)ci)
= β
∫
u ◦ gdp2 + (1− β)
∫
u ◦ gdci
≥ β min
p∈co(Pi)
∫
u ◦ gdp+ (1− β)
∫
u ◦ gdci
= β min
p∈co(Pi)
∫
u ◦ fdp+ (1− β)
∫
u ◦ fdci
= β
∫
u ◦ fdp1 + (1− β)
∫
u ◦ fdci
=
∫
u ◦ fd (βp1 + (1− β)ci)
≥ min
p∈F[Pi,ci]
∫
u ◦ fdp
which yields a contradiction. Therefore, β
i
= βi, and we have F[Pi,ci] = co(Pαii ) with αi = βi =
βi.
Step 2. ∃α s.t. ∀[Pi, ci] ∈ S, F[Pi,ci] = co(Pαi )
To simplify notation, denote αγ[Pi,ci]+(1−γ)[Pj ,cj ] by α(γ,i,j).
Suppose that α1 6= α2 for [P1, c1] , [P2, c2] ∈ S. Without loss of generality, consider that
S(P1) ∩ S(P2) = ∅.6 Let γ ∈ ]0, 1[. Since Condition 3 of Theorem 1 holds, we have that
Fγ[P1,c1]+(1−γ)[P2,c2] = γF[P1,c1] + (1− γ)F[P2,c2]
On the other hand,
Fγ[P1,c1]+(1−γ)[P2,c2] = co (γP1 + (1− γ)P2)α(γ,1,2)
Necessarily, either α(γ,1,2) 6= α1 or α(γ,1,2) 6= α2 and we run into a contradiction. For instance,
suppose α(γ,1,2) > α1 and consider pi ∈ co(Pi)\Int (co(Pi)) for i = 1, 2. We have then:
γ[α(γ,1,2)p1 + (1− α(γ,1,2))c1)] + (1− γ)
[
α(γ,1,2)p2 + (1− α(γ,1,2))c2
] ∈ Fγ[P1,c1]+(1−γ)[P2,c2]
and thus [
α(γ,1,2)p1 + (1− α(γ,1,2))c1
] ∈ F[P1,c1]
which yields a contradiction to the fact that α(γ,1,2) > α1. The proof can be adapted to the
other cases.
Step 3.
6We can always find a bijection ϕ such that S(P1)∩S(Pϕ2 ) = ∅ and it can be easily check that since Condition
1 of Theorem 1 holds, we have that α[P2,c2] = α[Pϕ2 ,c
ϕ
2 ]
.
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Finally, it can be easily checked that for all [P1, c1] , [P2, c2] ∈ S, for all f, g ∈ A,
min
p∈co(Pα1 )
∫
u ◦ fdp = α min
p∈co(P1)
∫
u ◦ fdp+ (1− α)
∫
u ◦ fdc1
Necessity
It is easy to check that Conditions 1 to 5 of Theorem 1 hold and thus following the previous
proofs, Axioms 1 to 7 hold. We hence simply have to check Axiom 10. Consider f, g ∈ A,
[P1, c1] , [P2, c2] ∈ S, such that (f, [{c1}c1])  (g, [{c2}, c2]) and for all p ∈ co(P1), there exists
q ∈ co(P2) such that (f, [{p}, p])  (g, [{q}, q]).
Given the representation obtained, this implies first that∫
u ◦ fdc1 ≥
∫
u ◦ gdc2
Furthermore, ∀p ∈ co(P1), there exists q ∈ co(P2) such that
∫
u ◦ fdp ≥ ∫ u ◦ gdq. Hence,
min
p∈co(P1)
∫
u ◦ fdp ≥ min
q∈co(P2)
∫
u ◦ gdq
Thus,
α min
p∈co(P1)
∫
u ◦ fdp+ (1− α)
∫
u ◦ fdc1 ≥ α min
p∈co(P2)
∫
u ◦ fdp+ (1− α)
∫
u ◦ gdc2
and thus (f, [P1, c1])  (g, [P2, c2]).
Proof. [Theorem 3]
For i ∈ {a, b}, let Vi(f, [P, c]) = min
p∈F i
[P,c]
∫
ui ◦ fdp (as defined in Theorem 1.)
[(i)⇒ (ii)]
Let (f, [P, c]) ∈ AB × S. By definition,
(
kPea(f,[P,c]), [P, c]
) ∼a (f, [P, c]). Since b is
more uncertainty averse than a, one has: (kPea(f,[P,c]), [P, c]) b (f, [P, c]), and, by definition,
(f, [P, c]) ∼b (kPeb(f,[P,c]), [P, c]). Therefore, (kPea(f,[P,c]), [P, c]) b (kPeb(f,[P,c]), [P, c]). Hence,
ua(kPea(f,[P,c])) ≥ ua(kPeb(f,[P,c])), i.e., using the normalization ui(δ0) = 0 and ui(δM ) = 1:
Πa(f, [P, c]) ≥ Πb(f, [P, c]).
[(ii)⇒ (iii)]
Let (f, [P, c]) ∈ AB × S. Using the normalization ui(δ0) = 0 and ui(δM ) = 1, we get:
Vi(f, [P, c]) = Πi(f, [P, c]), with i ∈ {a, b}. Assume that Πa(f, [P, c]) ≥ Πb(f, [P, c]). This
implies Va(f, [P, c]) ≥ Vb(f, [P, c]), for all (f, [P, c]) ∈ AB×S. Therefore, using the representation
given in Theorem 1,7 min
p∈Fa
[P,c]
∫
u ◦ fdp ≥ min
p∈Fb
[P,c]
∫
u ◦ fdp. Assume Fa[P,c] 6⊂ Fb[P,c]. Then, there
7Since f ∈ AB , we can, using the normalization above, restrict our attention to ua = ub = u.
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exists p∗ ∈ Fa[P,c] such that p∗ 6∈ Fb[P,c]. Hence, using a separation argument, we know there
exists a function φ : S → R such that ∫ φdp∗ < min
p∈Fb
[P,c]
∫
φdp. Since S(P) is a finite set, there
exist numbers a > 0 and b, such that for all s ∈ S(P), (aφ(s)+b ∈ u(Y )). Then, for all s ∈ S(P),
there exits y(s) ∈ YB such that u(y(s)) = aφ(s) + b. Define f by f(s) = y(s) for all s ∈ S(P),
and f(s) = δ0 for all s ∈ S \ S(P). We then obtain:
∫
u ◦ fdp∗ < min
p∈Fb
[P,c]
∫
u ◦ fdp. Therefore,
min
p∈Fa
[P,c]
∫
u◦fdp < min
p∈Fb
[P,c]
∫
u◦fdp, i.e., Va(f, [P, c]) = Πa(f, [P, c]) < Vb(f, [P, c]) = Vb(f, [P, c]),
which yields a contradiction.
[(iii)⇒ (i)]
Straightforward.
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